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R&D Spin-outs in the Pharmaceutical Industry
that someoperations canbeperformedmore effec-
tively by a third party, for example, on a superior
scale,with lower costs or through direct access to
proprietary know-how. An alternative strategy to
the specialist group in-house is to introducebusiness
flexibility in the organisational structure.
On the other hand, spinning out non-core
activities towards newventures also increases coor-
dination costs (Clarysse et al., 2005) andpotentially
hampers spillover effects and destroys potential
benefits ofmutually reinforcingactivities (Audretsch
and Lehmann, 2005; Lockett et al., 2005).
Furthermore, the new venture spun out from the
parent organisation might, over time, could
potentially develop into a new competitor for the
parent organisation (Steffensen et al., 2000).
The pressure to reassess their mode of R&D
operation has fostered the spin-out of activities
within pharmaceutical companies - as part of the
notion of corporate entrepreneurship (Sharmaand
Chrisman, 1999). As Chemmanur and Yan (2004)
indicated,companies in rapidly changing industries
aremore likely to spin-out divisions.As a result, the
number of corporate R&D spin-outs in the
pharmaceutical industry has increased significantly
during the last years (Chemmanur andYan,2004).
The common definition of spin-out is when a part
1. Introduction
Global competitiveness is becoming increasingly
important to the pharmaceutical industry.
Pharmaceutical companies are exploring options
to enhance the efficiency of the resources they are
using at all stages of the value chain, fromdiscovery
research to production and logistics aswell as sales
andmarketing. Especially the expiration of a high
numberof their blockbuster patents, thehigh failure
rate of new drugs or active pharmaceutical
ingredients (Findlay, 2007), and the rising costs of
pharmaceutical R&Dhave led to agrowingpressure
to refocus on core activities to increase the output
together with the realisation of cost saving
potentials (Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003).
Furthermore, literature on the impact of size on
R&Dproductivity has not been conclusive and the
convincing evidence that inventiveness improves
within anever-increasing size of R&D infrastructure
is lacking for thepharmaceutical industry (Dewdney
and Smith, 1998). In that context, pharmaceutical
companies are increasingly considering the
divestment of non-core activities in order to
concentrate management attention as well as
financial and other resources on focus areas.
Furthermore,companiesare increasingly recognising
Thehighnumberof researchanddevelopment (R&D) spin-outs in thepharmaceutical
industryduring the last 10years focusingondrugdevelopmentoroffering specialised
services demonstrates that pharmaceutical companies believe, throughdoing this,
they can improve R&Dperformance. In a study, 43 European drug development as
well as service oriented R&D spin-outs were analysedwith regard to background,
impact, realisation and the underlying strategy of the pharmaceutical parent
companies. Spin-out creation can help to refocus the company strategy. Following
a merger or simply complementing a strategic realignment on core areas, spin-
outs provide a valuable option to leverage assets of low strategic importance, or
under-exploited assets in their parent companies. Key aspects are strengthening
the entrepreneurial spirit, a clear focus on core activities, performance-oriented
controlling throughcash-drivenkey indicators,high identificationwith the company,
and appropriate financial incentives for management and staff.
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The paper will then present the methodology
applied to obtain a better insight of the use of R&D
spin-outs in the pharmaceutical industry,and look
at the reasons for and effects of R&D spin-outs
from the parent company's point of view.
Furthermore, the paper will outline critical issues
and for the realisation of a spin-out (conceptual
design of R&D spin-outs) and how they could be
handled.The paper closeswith two case studies as
illustrative example and a discussion of the
implications and conclusions.
2. Theoretical Background
There are various reasons for realising a R&D
spin-out. This section provides conceptual
arguments (bothpotential benefits anddownsides)
of R&D spin-outs, while empirical evidence with
regard to these argumentswill be discussed in the
results’section. In the case of redundant capacities
or non-core activities (e.g. after a merger of two
pharmaceutical companies),a spin-out canbeused
to reduce costs as analternative to closingor selling
the unit (Bergh and Lim, 2008; Chemmanur and
Yan, 2004; Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003). An-
other reason could be the reduction of capital
requirements and risk, if R&D projects are not in
the strategic focus of a pharmaceutical company
(Chemmanur and Yan, 2004).
But spin-outs can also be used froma strategic
point of view as a method to make R&D more
flexible for increased effectiveness and efficiency
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).There are
often innovation hurdles in companies with
established structures, like bureaucratic thinking,
fear of cannibalismor thewell-known 'not invented
here' syndrome.R&Dspin-outs canovercome these
hurdles through their different cultures (Bergh and
Lim, 2008; Jagersma and van Gorp, 2003;
Parhankangas andArenius,2003).All the energy of
the new spin-out’s management team can be put
into the commercialisation of the R&D activities.
R&D spin-outs can more easily pick up external
impulses and serve as a mechanism to explore
revolutionary ideas in a setting apart from
mainstream business (Jagersma and van Gorp,
2003;ParhankangasandArenius,2003).For example,
competencies from other companies or top-class
scientists from universities and public research
agencies canbebrought together to formexcellent
teams. Spin-outs can also be beneficial from the
spin-out’s management team’s view, given the
increasedpotential to develop aprofitable business
model (more or less) independently from theparent
organisation. This can be done by expanding the
customer base substantially to other companies
and bringing the development of the technologies
(department,businessunit divisionor evenaproject
team) of a company or organisation becomes an
independent business (De Cleyn and Braet, 2009).
The spin-out company takes personnel, assets,
intellectual property, technology, and/or existing
products from the parent organisation. In many
cases themanagement teamof the new company
originates from the same parent organisation. In
contrast to the term R&D spin-out, an R&D spin-
off is a new company based on the findings of a
research group fromacademia (DeCleyn andBraet,
2009; Mustar et al., 2006). But the two terms are
not always usedunambiguously,as sometimes the
term corporate spin-off is used instead of spin-out
or spin-off is used for a small company which has
been split-off from a larger, parent organisation
(De Cleyn and Braet, 2009;Mustar et al., 2006).
This paper describes how R&D spin-outs can
support drug discovery and development strate-
gies of pharmaceutical companies by creating
flexible R&D resources and structures. In a first
effort, interviews were conducted with managers
and experts of 19 different pharmaceutical
companies and 12 pharmaceutical service providers.
Subsequently, 43 European spin-outs of
pharmaceutical companies were analysed using
empirical data and case studies obtained fromdesk
research, and detailed interviews with R&D
managers of 11 of these R&D spin-outs.
The aim of the paper is twofold: [1] adopting a
more conceptual or theoretical perspective, it aims
at discussing thepros and cons of spin-out ventures
fromboth the viewpoint of spin-outmanagement
(the entrepreneurs) and parent company and [2] it
intends to provide empirical evidence from the
specific situation of the pharmaceutical industry
to support these conceptual arguments by using
interviews and illustrative case studies. At a more
detailed level, this paper addresses the following
research questions:
1. What are the main conceptual arguments to
(dis)favour the use of spin-outs, from both the
spin-out’s and the parent organisation’s
perspective and to what extent are the
arguments valid according to the empirical
evidence?
2.Do spin-outs increase R&D performance and
flexibility in the pharmaceutical industry?
3.What are best practicescritical issues for
stakeholders in the spin-out process that can
be identified from the empirical evidence?
This paper will firstly discuss the theoretical
background on the use of R&D spin-out ventures.
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benefits associated toworking for a large company
might be diluted (temporarily). Lastly, a strategic
risk for the parent organisation emerges: the new
spin-out might over a longer term potentially
develop into a new competitor for the parent
organisation (Steffensen et al., 2000).
3.Methodological aspects
The empirical data and case examples were
obtained during two independent investigations.
In a first investigation between 2002 and 2005, in
order to gain a better insight into outsourcing
activities within the pharmaceutical industry,
interviews were conducted with managers and
experts of 19 different pharmaceutical companies
and 12 pharmaceutical service providers. Some of
these companies had also been independently
interviewedwithin the second investigation,which
wasperformedbetween2004and2008 (first round
in 2004and second round including the companies
from round 1 in 2008).Here,43 EuropeanR&Dspin-
outs fromdifferent European countries (Austria (3),
Belgium (1), Denmark (1), France (4), Germany (14),
Italy (6), Spain (1), Sweden (2), Switzerland (7) and
U.K. (4)) were analysed through desk research,and
R&D managers from 11 of these spin-outs were
interviewed (between 2004 and 2005).
Each company was interviewed in one or two
sittings of approximately onehour each.A reference
set of questions was developed as a guideline for
the interview, thereby leaving enough room for
spontaneousanswers,whichgavea semi-structured
nature to the interviews.Before each interview, the
authors had gathered in-depth information on the
company through various public sources (e.g.
juridical databases) and company disclosures
(website, press releases etc.), enabling an efficient
conducting of the interviews.Afterwards, the same
information sourceswere used for reasons of data-
triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Based on the desk research and interviewdata,
analyseswere conductedwhich are presented and
discussed in the following sections. First, for each
of the spin-outs, some basic information was
collected (year of founding, tpye of parent company,
development of the spin-out from foundation to
2008, development of the number of employees
form foundation to 2008, position in the
pharmaceutical value chain).
Important is the separate evaluation of drug
development spin-outs and service oriented spin-
outs.To assign spin-outs to one of both groups, the
business model and end products were analysed:
the first group discovers, develops and
commercialises new drugs, whereas the second
groupacts as serviceprovider for thepharmaceutical
and accompanying services further in the
development thanwould have been the case in an
internal project within the parent organisation.
Furthermore, the spin-outs (topmanagement) team
mayhave stronger incentives tomake the spin-out
project successful and benefit from potential
upsides. Besides spin-outs focussing on drug
discovery anddevelopment, there is a secondgroup
of spin-outs offering specialised services (e.g. for
drug discovery services like lead optimisation,
toxicologyor analytics,or drugdevelopment services
like clinical studies or formulation services). They
are often outsourcing partners for established
pharmaceutical companies. Outsourcing in
pharmaceutical R&Drequires specialisedbusinesses
that understand the strict regulatory barriers and
high risk associatedwith the development lifecycle
(Clark andNewton,2004;Findlay,2007;VanArnum,
2008).Therefore,understandingoutsourcingmecha-
nisms in the pharmaceutical industry is important
for the analysis of the spinning out of service based
activities.
This is especially true, if outsourcing is used to
strengthen internal competencies by combining
internal know-how development and external
sourcing (Veugelers andCassiman, 1999).There are
good arguments to stress the complementarity
between in-house R&D and external know-how
(Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Cockburn and
Henderson, 1998; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002).
For example, Arora and Gambardella (1990)
examined the complementarity among external
sourcing strategies of large firms in the
biotechnology industry.At the same time theaccess
to external know-howmay leverage theproductivity
of the internal R&D activities, at least when the
organisation exhibits a willingness to take on
external ideas (Veugelers, 1997).An important task
in innovationmanagement, therefore, is tooptimally
integrate internal and external knowledge within
the innovation process, to be able to benefit from
the positive effects each activity has on the other.
Besides thesepotential benefits for both entities
(parent and spin-out), somedownsidesmay appear
as well. Spinning out non-core activities towards
new ventures bears the risk of increased
coordination costs,as the spin-out nowserves other
interests than an internal project would do (it is no
longer a ‘cost centre’, but should be profitable as
any other business) (Clarysse et al., 2005).
Furthermore, the independent trajectory of the
spin-out potentially hampers spillover effects and
destroys potential benefits ofmutually reinforcing
activities (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005; Lockett
et al., 2005). For the spin-out team, the newproject
bears the risks associated to any other new
entrepreneurial initiative. The ‘certainties’ and
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Figure 1 Year of founding the spin-outs.
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Table 1 Relevance and weighting factors for the analysis of the spin-out reasons.
Dimensions Criteria
Relevance for Weighting factors
Drug
development
Service
provider
Drug
development
Service
provider
Costs
Less overhead costs + ++ 8% 12%
Less personnel cots + 0% 8%
Better economies of scale ++ 0% 12%
Better economies of scope + ++ 8% 12%
Risks
Lover investment risk + + 8% 8%
Lower risk of losing focus ++ + 12% 8%
Lower risk for other activities ++ 12% 0%
Lower risk for image + 8% 0%
Performance
Higher committment of people + + 8% 8%
Clear strategy and targets ++ ++ 12% 12%
More flexibility ++ ++ 12% 12%
Better co-operation possibilities ++ + 12% 8%
100% 100%
R&D Spin-outs in the Pharmaceutical Industry
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weighting factor 8% and very high relevance ++
the weighting factor 12%, so that with 5 +’s and 5
++’s, the weighting factor, in total, is 100% in both
cases. A score between 1 and 5 was assigned for
each spin-out based on the interview results and
desk research (1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4
= high, 5 = very high) and a total score for each
dimension calculated. This gave a typical value for
each business model along the three dimensions,
costs, risks and performance.
3. Results of the analysis and interviews
Background information regarding the R&D spin-
outs and their parents
First spin-out within our analysis was Focus
Clinical Drug Development, which was founded in
1992 (Figure 1). The highest spin-out activity was in
2001 and 2006 with six spin-outs respectively.
Analysing the examples of Novartis and Aventis,
spin-outs occur two and three years after mergers
and acquisition (M&A) activities of large
pharmaceutical companies.
Novartis was the result of the merger of Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz in 1996. After spinning-
out Gendata in 1996, Speedel followed in
1998 and then Solvias and Zeptosens in 1999.
and biotech industry (including the development
of new technologies and tools to offer their services). 
To understand the reasons and success factors
of R&D spin-outs a standardised questionnaire was
used during the interviews within the first
investigation. This questionnaire included nine
questions each for reasons and success factors,
which could be answered on a Likert scale from 1
to 4 (impact: 1 = not true, 4 = true; success factors:
1 = not important, 4 = important). The answers were
evaluated separately for drug development and
service spin-outs. Two further answers were
collected from each interviewee: one answer as
spin-out and one reflecting the perceived answer
of the parent company.
Within the interviews the questions regarding
the reasons to spin-out activities were answered
with general answers like “lower costs”, “more
flexibility” or “better quality”. Therefore, a comparable
analysis of the different spin-outs was not possible.
For a better understanding of the reasons for the
spin-outs, an evaluation model to identify and
quantify underlying reasons was developed based
on the interview results. Within each of the three
dimensions, costs, risks and performance, four main
drivers were identified. For each driver, the relevance
for a drug development and a service provider spin-
out was assumed and correlating weighting factors
defined (Table 1): high relevance + gave the
Figure 2 Type of parent company.
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Figure 4 Positioning in the pharmaceutical value chain.
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Figure 3 Development of the company from foundation to 2008.
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Nearly one quarter had been sold to a new owner
and one fifth (only drug development spin-outs)
had gone public via an initial public offering (IPO).
Only two companies no longer exist. Therefore, the
survival rate is rather high. Reasons are the high
qualification of the employees (especially of the
management) in the sense of higher practical
experience in the relevant industry and assets from
the parent company, patents or laboratories,
reducing the capital requirements significantly.
Consequently, spin-outs do not have to invest time
and money in building-up infrastructure and their
intellectual property (IP) position, so that they can
pay much more attention to business development
from their foundation onwards. 
The development of the number of employees
from 2003 to 2008 within spin-outs founded in
2003 or earlier is positive. The data of only 19
companies could be found in publicly available data.
Of the 19 companies, around 67% of drug
development spin-outs and 57% of service provider
spin-outs had increased the number of personnel
since their founding 
Only three of the spin-outs showed static
growth in personnel. A decrease was mainly seen
at drug development spin-outs with 25% (five out
of 19) of them having a lower number of personnel
since their founding. The average personnel growth
was 113 employees from drug development spin-
Aventis was formed in 1999 as a merger of
Hoechst and Rhone Poulenc. The first spin-
outs were Gencell, Nanogen Recognomics
and Xzillion in 2001 and then Covidence and
Proskelia in 2002.
Most of these spin-outs were service providers
and this could be an indication that the major
intention was to reduce overcapacities after the
M&A transaction. But there are also examples where
spin-out activities are not the result of M&A
activities, like the Roche spin-outs Actelion (1997),
Novuspharma (1999), Basilea Pharmaceutica (2000)
and BioXell (2002). 
Parent companies are large pharmaceutical
companies (“big pharma”), mid-sized pharmaceu-
tical companies, biotech companies and
pharmaceutical service providers. The phrase “big
pharma” is often used to refer to companies with
revenue in excess of US$ 3 billion, and/or R&D
expenditure in excess of US$ 500 million. Smaller
companies are categorised as mid-size pharma.
With regard to the type of parent company, most
of the spin-outs and almost all service providers
came from “big pharma” (Figure 2) and only a few
from the other types of parent company.
Analysing the development of the company
from foundation up to 2008 shows that more than
50% of the spin-outs are still independent (Figure 3).
Figure5 Interview answers regarding reasons for and effects of R&D spin-outs.
Company and R&D strategy Company and R&D strategy of the parent
company is supported
Flexibility
Speed
Innovation capability
Commercialisation
Costs
Market access
Co-operation
Employees
Increase in R&D flexibility
Increase R&D speed
Growth of innovation capability
Speeding up of commercialisation and higher
possibility of success
Lowering of total costs
Improvement of market access
Improvement of cooperation possibilities
Higher employee motivation
Drug development
Service provider:
Parent company
Parent company
R&D Spin-outs
R&D Spint-outs
Not true True
1          2         3        4
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and Medigenomix (SP 1), or drug development with
examples, like Covidence and Focus Clinical Drug
Development (SP 2). Most of the companies in group
SP 2 are clinical research organisations (CRO) with
core activity in management of clinical trials.
Companies covering both areas with the same
priority, like Solvias, are very seldom (SP 3).
Figure 4 indicates that all aspects of the value
chain are susceptible to new business models and
risk isolation from the part of big pharmaceutical
companies. The examples indicate that mostly the
spin-outs focus on selected activities within the
value chain (rather than trying to cover various
aspects, with the exception of Solvias). Furthermore,
Figure 4 suggests that in the area of service provision
during the product launch, marketing and manufac-
turing phase, low spin-out activity is currently
registered. This might have several underlying
reasons: [1] the big pharmaceutical companies
consider these activities as part of their core, [2]
these activities require substantial investments in
large-scale production facilities, marketing budgets
and sales and distribution channels, making them
less suitable for new ventures or [3] new spin-out
initiatives have not found a workable business
model (yet) to operate in this part of the value chain.
As Figure 4 indicates, R&D spin-outs are used by
parent organisations in (almost) all parts of the
outs (min. = -47 and max. = +1104 in absolute figures;
average of +67% in relative terms, min. = -40%;
max. = +213%) and 20 employees for service
providing spin-outs (min. = -6 and max. = +58 in
absolute figures; average of +62% in relative terms,
min. = -30%; max. = +232%). This shows that the
majority of the spin-outs manage to establish a
successful business model within a 5-year period
and successfully attract a profitable customer base
enabling them to grow.
Business models and reasons for R&D spin-outs
The analysis regarding the positioning in the
pharmaceutical value chain shows that R&D spin-
outs can be found in all areas of the pharmaceutical
value chain, forming typical groups with specific
business models (Figure 4). In the drug development
area there are companies like Eucodis and Gencell
with focus on basic research and drug discovery
(DED 1), companies, like Alberio and Basilea
Pharmaceutica, with focus on drug development
without own marketing resources (DD 2) and
companies, like Actelion and Biovitrum, which have
grown to fully integrated pharmaceutical companies
covering drug development and marketing (DD 3).
Within service providers there are groups focusing
on drug discovery with companies, like Genedata
Strategy Clear strategy orientation of the R&D spin-out
Focus
Management team
Success participation
Patents
Independence
Physical separation
Equity capital
Debt capital
Clear content focus of the R&D spin-out 
Quality and conviction of the management team
Management and employee success participation 
Complete ownership of all relevant patents
Operative independence of the spin-out as far as
possible
Physical separation from the parent company
Financing of equity capital independent of the
parent company
Financing of debt capital independent of the
parent company
Drug development
Service provider:
Parent company
Parent company
Not important Important
1          2         3        4
R&D Spin-outs
R&D Spint-outs
Figure 6 Interview answers regarding success factors of R&D spin-outs .
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out’s perspective, the spin-out process receives a
positive evaluation and seems to be beneficial to
both parties (except maybe for the service providing
spin-outs from the parent company’s viewpoint).
The strongest effects can be found in speeding up
the commercialisation process of new technologies,
reducing the overall cost for all entities and improving
cooperation possibilities from both perspectives.
Other strong positive effects relate to increasing
R&D speed and flexibility in the R&D process.
Some fundamental issues are to be considered
when structuring an R&D spin-out (Figure 6). The
results from the interviews reveal some interesting
facts. It is important to focus the new enterprise on
a few core activities. For non-core activities partnering
and/or outsourcing on the basis of strategic make-
or-buy decisions is necessary. Otherwise the spin-
out loses focus. The build-up of heavy bureaucratic
structures must be avoided and a transfer of all
relevant assets (i.e. laboratories, equipment, patents
and other IP rights like copyrights and trademarks)
as well as key personnel (tacit knowledge) to the
spin-out is essential. 
The interview partners stated clearly that a new
company with its own legal entity, including logo
and name, must be established to demonstrate the
independence from the former parent company.
The management and scientific team are key
components. They must believe implicitly in their
science, they must be willing to commit their careers
to the exploitation of this science and they must
have the entrepreneurial, risk-taking drive. Generally,
a very important aspect of designing an R&D spin-
out is staffing and incentives for the key people.
Therefore, an adequate and transparent profit-
sharing model between parent company,
management and employees of the new company
as well as financial investors is fundamental. This
includes a well-balanced and transparent profit
sharing model for management and employees,
equity or option programmes. Management should
hold a significant equity stake in the company which
is in the range of between 10 and 30% (depending
on the size of the spin-out company). 
Managing remaining ties between the spin-out
and its parent company is essential to the success
of the spin-out. While the parent company should
retain limited equity and product rights in the spin-
out company, excessive product trumping or
management interference from the parent company
deters investors and impedes the spin-out
entrepreneurial attitude. It is extremely difficult to
put a monetary value on early phase research.
Without patent protection, value becomes even
more intangible. In order to be fundable, the spin-
out must have the complete right to use the
transferred IP for its intended field of use, subject
value chain to increase flexibility and lower risks
associated to new developments.
The interview results regarding the reasons for
R&D spin-outs shown in Figure 5, such as support
of the company and their R&D strategy, provide
mixed evidence for the theoretical arguments set
forth earlier. Spinning out R&D activities increases
the performance in specific fields of R&D through
higher flexibility and innovation capability. By
reducing the management complexity of the parent
company the full entrepreneurial energy of the
management team can be spent on
commercialisation. The interviews showed that, in
general, total costs are lowered through a reduction
or variabilisation of fixed costs, R&D flexibility and
speed increase. Commercialisation speeds up and
there is a higher possibility of success. Drivers are
cooperations and increased employee motivation.
In a disinvestment case, a restructuring is easier to
carry out with spin-outs. Last but not least, financial
risks for the parent company can be reduced. Overall,
Figure 5 provides empirical evidence that the
benefits of using R&D spin-outs in the
pharmaceutical industry are perceived more
beneficial by spin-out managers than by parent
organisations. On most statements, both spin-out
managers and parent organisation perceive positive
effects, except for service providing spin-outs from
the parent organisation’s viewpoint. The results
thus suggest that using R&D spin-outs for drug
developments seems to provide more benefits for
the parent organisations, while from the viewpoint
of the spin-outs themselves, any of the two types
has positive perceived effects.
To get a better understanding of the reasons
for R&D spin-outs, they were evaluated using the
evaluation model described in the previous chapter.
It could be shown that a spin-out is not only created
to reduce costs as an alternative to closing or selling
the unit. The reasons are more complex and can be
shown by the three dimensions:, costs, risks and
performance. These three dimensions are, of course,
interrelated. From the interviews, some trends
appear. Service providing activities are mainly spun
out for cost cutting reasons, while for drug
development spin-outs the main driver appears to
be isolation of risks. In either of the two groups,
enhancing the parent company’s performance
seems to be a main driver in the spin-out decision
process.
Overall, these results suggest that R&D spin-
outs are, in most cases and in many regards,
beneficial for both parent organisations and spin-
outs. On average, spin-outs achieve high survival
rates and manage to grow substantially over a
relatively limited time period (5 years). Furthermore,
from both the parent company’s asand the spin-
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show the advantages of flexible structures. This
case study combines the drug development and
service provider view as Solvias as well as Speedel
are both spin-out companies from the Swiss
pharmaceutical company Novartis. The second case,
Accovion, nearly doubled the number of employees
within 6 years, which shows growth potential of a
CRO. The information presented on both cases is
the result of publicly available information collected
through desk research and the interviews with
managers of both cases.
Speedel and Solvias: Success through partnership
Solvias was founded in 1999 as a management
buyout from Novartis in Basel, Switzerland, offering
many different services to the pharmaceutical
industry with special expertise in chemical synthesis,
which is the synthesis of chemical compounds in
drug discovery (lead structures and lead compounds,
lead optimisation) and drug development
(substances for preclinical and clinical trials).
Furthermore, this is combined with process
development know-how, covering operations and
services associated with the development of an
industrially feasible process, such as process research
(including supply of first product lots for preclinical
and clinical trials), process development and process
optimisation.
The pharmaceutical company Speedel, also
based in Basel, Switzerland, was founded by a group
of Novartis managers to realise a development
project which Novartis had stopped. They started
as a virtual company with only project management
in-house and, therefore, relied on outsourcing
partners. Speedel’s first project was SPP 100 with
Aliskiren, an oral renin inhibitor licensed from
Novartis, as new chemical entity. The challenge was
to develop a cost-effective synthesis route for
Aliskiren – a task where Novartis with its in-house
resources failed. Speedel’s strength compared to
Novartis was the flexibility to select the most
suitable partner for solving the synthesis problem.
Solvias was selected to bring in special synthesis
and catalysis technology as well as the ability to
follow up with analytics. The number of Solvias
staff involved in this project varied over time. 
After Speedel’s successful and rapid development
of the project to phase II, Novartis agreed to license
the product back for final phase III development
and commercialisation. In July 2008, Novartis started
a take-over process to become majority shareholder
in Speedel. From Novartis’ viewpoint, the advantages
of spinning out the SPP 100 project to Speedel and
using the flexible resources of Solvias are obvious.
Novartis could reduce and control its develop-ment
risks for SPP 100, and at the same time keep the
project in its portfolio. Speedel selected an excellent
to termination only under very limited conditions.
Whether structured as an assignment or a license,
defining the terms of the technology transfer from
the parent company to the spin-out is an important
aspect. Issues to focus on include detailed
regulations regarding the IP (e.g. kind of transfer
including covering of costs, exclusive use in special
technology fields, therapeutic areas or regions, “first
right of refusal” or veto rights for the parent
company).
The issues discussed in this section based on
the interview results seem to suggest, however (see
Figure 6), that large differences exist in the priorities
and concerns risen by parent organisations and
spin-out managers during the spin-out process.
The main concern for the parent organisation seems
to be of strategic nature. On the other hand, spin-
out managers are confronted with many crucial
aspects and preconditions which shape the potential
and future of the spin-out. Especially the operational
independence from the parent company, the quality
and conviction of the spin-out’s management team
and their participation in case of a successful spin-
out seem crucial.
Positioning as external service provider
One major intention of pharmaceutical
companies, especially regarding service spin-outs,
is the establishment of an efficient external market
for pharmaceutical services. If, however, there is
high complexity in the processes between service
provider and customer, or interfaces, which are
difficult to define, the tendency towards outsourcing
declines. Therefore, it is important for service
providers to define highly standardised and
transparent processes and contracts. Those service
providers with laboratory resources out of Europe
or North America should be able to offer project
management services to European and North
American customers close to home. It is also
important for service providers to ensure a flexible
project execution with stringent quality control
and establish full cost transparency and an easy
invoicing process. Companies prefer contracts with
fixed prices (mostly attached to milestones), which
allow a better cost calculation of the project. In
order to remedy the concerns customers have
regarding IP, exclusivity and secrecy, a cooperation
agreement should include that all critical IP remains
with the customer and there should be clear and
transparent rules regarding the engagement in
projects of direct competitors (De Cleyn and Braet,
2008).
4. Case studies of successful spin-outs
The Speedel/Solvias case is a good example to
partners and was able to quickly allocate resources
(staff and equipment) to match the variable project
needs. The improvement in flexibility was twofold:
capacity-wise it was possible to adjust the necessary
resources the development need and progress
without building-up additional fixed costs and
expertise-wise, Speedel had the opportunity to
chose the most promising technical approach
independent from company internal restrictions.
The Speedel/Solvias case is a good example to
show that the cooperation with spin-out com-
panies allows a rapid and flexible combination of
skills, resources and know-how, thus speeding up
the development process. Furthermore, it illustrates
the potential benefits for both parties involved.
Accovion: Success through growth opportunities
Accovion, formally Covidence, is a CRO formed
in 2002 from the global clinical research, medical
writing, pharmaceutical covigilance, biostatistics
and data management departments of Aventis
Pharma in Frankfurt, Germany, which was formed
through the merger of Hoechst and Rhone Poulenc.
Accovion’s core business is regional and global
projects ranging from phase I to IV clinical studies
and global submission. The spin-out process started
in February 2000 and some 2 years later, Accovion
started business with about 120 employees. Venture
capitalist 3i held a 30% stake in Accovion as a
financial investor, 30% was held by the man-
agement of Covidence, and the remaining 40% by
Aventis. Meanwhile, Aventis, now Sanofi-Aventis,
has sold its stakes and Accovion is currently owned
by its management, Heidelberg Capital and Creathor
Venture. 
Since its foundation, Accovion is on a growth
path through the acquisition of external teams. In
2003, Accovion acquired more than 30 Oracle Clinical
data management and biostatistics experts from
Aventis Behring, making Accovion the long-term
preferred clinical development services provider for
Aventis Behring. Accovion also formed alliances,
e.g. with OSMO, the largest oncology site
management organisation in France, or with US-
based ReSearch Pharmaceutical Services (RPS), a
pharmaceutical resource organisation. Meanwhile,
Accovion has 200 employees and is established as
a partner for all major pharmaceutical companies
on a global scale. The Accovion case shows the
possible growth potential if an internal project is
spun-out and has the opportunity to commercialise
its technology and knowledge for a broader
customer base than only for internal parent
company activities. Specialised expertise was built
up or acquired which now can be used by the whole
customer base.
5. Implications and conclusion 
Today, many areas of the R&D process chain can
be outsourced and covered by external service
providers. Over the past five years, the number of
spin-outs in the pharmaceutical industry has
increased and seems set to continue to grow further,
as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
view, with an increasing interest, the possibilities
offered by spin-out deals. Especially the future cost
pressure and need for new products will boost the
trend towards R&D spin-outs. The reason for this
is that for more and more R&D projects, which are
neither to be stopped nor sold, there are not enough
company internal resources (capital, management
capacity) available. Spin-out creation can also help
to refocus the company strategy. Following a merger
or simply complementing a strategic realignment
on core areas, spin-outs provide a valuable option
to leverage assets of low strategic importance, or
under-exploited assets in their parent companies.
Another possible reason to opt for a spin-out is the
isolation of a high-risk core business project, in
order to prevent the project from affecting the
riskiness of the core company. The empirical evidence
seems to support these conceptual arguments to
a large extent.
These developments enable pharmaceutical
companies to concentrate on own core activities,
without having to abandon new products coming
from the spin-outs and the correlating value creation
potential (Cooke, 2001). Especially service-oriented
spin-outs contribute towards this, as these provide
external services to support pharmaceutical
research. But also spin-outs focussed on the
development of pharmaceuticals, which represent
the majority of the R&D spin-outs, support this
change, as they prefer to use such services. Drug
development spin-outs are potential assets for spin-
out initiatives or as currency with which to ‘do deals’
with other companies. The discovery function may
even become a revenue-generating centre rather
than a cost-centre. This is not an unrealistic vision;
small companies already operate in this way, using
research assets as currency in setting up deals and
alliances (Dewdney and Smith, 1998).
Also, highly specialised research service providers
will play a more important role and integrative part
of the processes in the pharmaceutical industry.
The result is a professional market for highly
specialised services, which benefits all research-
based pharmaceutical companies. The more flexible
structures within the services networks make
pharmaceutical research more efficient. This
correlation could be made, due to the increase in
drugs introduced to the market over the past years,
after the number reached a low point shortly after
the turn of the millenium. Contributing to the
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increase are the many successful spin-outs, which
have developed new products and, alone or together
with partners from the established pharmaceutical
industry, have brought these onto the market (e.g.
Actelion, Speedel).
The empirical evidence provided by this study
suggests that the theoretical benefits from using
spin-outs in the pharmaceutical value chain,
amongst other reasons, to increase flexibility and
reduce costs, to a large extent seem to be avid from
both the parent company’s and spin-out
management’s perspective. The effective realisation
of these benefits is especially true for drug
development spin-outs. For service providing spin-
outs, the outcome is mainly perceived beneficial
from the spin-out’s perspective, while the parent
organisations are more sceptical. However, overall,
R&D spin-outs do seems to have a positive impact
for both the parent organisation and the spin-out
team, in terms of flexibility, motivation and overall
performance.
6. Limitations and further research
Limitations
An important limitation of our study relates to
the data gathering methodology. In most cases,
data have been obtained with a single respondent
per firm. Data-triangulation then becomes difficult,
especially for inside company information. A second
limitation relates to the geographical diversity of
sample firms in our research. The predominance of
German and Swiss spin-outs, which is (probably) a
distorted sample of the real population, might have
influenced our findings. In order to fully understand
the dynamics of spin-outs in the pharmaceutical
industry, it might be necessary to investigate spin-
outs outside Europe. A last limitation relates to the
measurement of perceived relevance based on
personal perception rather than on actual
importance. Respondents’ perceptions might distort
actual results, as their lens on the world might lead
to a faulty perception of reality. Especially in
combination with the first limitation (single
respondent), this measurement choice might affect
the strength of our conclusions.
Further research
In a more longitudinal setting, future meso-level
research could evaluate if spin-outs really contribute
to increasing effectiveness over the entire value
chain in the pharmaceutical indus-try. More on a
micro-level, an interesting line of research could
assess the viability and performance of individual
spin-outs and eventual differences between service-
oriented and drug development ventures in this
regard. Finally, more in-depth knowledge is needed
on the strategic motives for parent company to
spin-out a certain activity and how they deal with
eventual successful development of their spin-outs
afterwards. Understanding the process of spinning
out and reintegrating the venture could contribute
to the knowledge base on industry dynamics and
corporate spin-out ventures.
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